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SHOULD FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY EXTEND TO
THE CONTEXT OF NEWLY ISSUED SECURITIES?
JOSEPH DE SIMONE
INTRODUCTION
Penelope Prudent, regular reader of the Wall Street Journal, decided
to invest some of her hard-earned money in securities. Based on the ad-
vice of her broker and her general knowledge of the securities market,
Penelope purchased stock at $35 per share in Dastardly, Inc., an actively
traded company on the New York Stock Exchange. She also purchased
a new series of revenue bonds issued jointly by the New York Elderly
Assistance Board and Do Good, Inc. to finance the construction of an
affordable retirement home complex for the elderly.
One month prior to Penelope's purchase, Dastardly, Inc.'s stock was
trading at $20 per share when Dick Dastardly, Chief Executive Officer of
the company, boasted in a press release and related Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") disclosure documents about Dastardly
Inc.'s strong showing of double digit growth for the past five quarters. In
those same documents, Dastardly also predicted huge future profits
based on a new product line that the corporation had perfected ahead of
schedule. Penelope was not aware of Dastardly's press release nor had
she read any of Dastardly, Inc.'s disclosure documents. Those docu-
ments, in fact, contained serious misstatements. The company's earnings
and profits had been inflated through illegal accounting maneuvers, and
there was no new product line. On the revenue bond side, Dick Das-
tardly's distant cousin, Dan, President of Do Good, Inc., had set up a
scheme to abscond with the bond proceeds. As part of that scheme, Dan
made a series of false statements in connection with the financing and
construction of the retirement home complex that were incorporated into
the bond's offering circular. Penelope had never read the offering circu-
lar, however.
Four months later, after Dick and Dan Dastardly had left the country,
the Wall Street Journal reported that Dastardly, Inc. announced it was
restating its earnings for the past two years to reflect the large losses it
had actually incurred, and that it would finally begin to develop the
promised new product line. Immediately following this announcement,
Dastardly, Inc.'s stock dropped to $10 per share. At the same time, Do
Good, Inc. had announced that there was insufficient funding to continue
with the development of the retirement complex and that, as a result, it
had defaulted on its bond payments. Contending that she had been de-
frauded, Penelope filed separate class actions on behalf of herself and
similarly situated plaintiffs against (1) Dastardly, Inc. and its directors
and officers, and (2) Do Good, Inc., its directors and officers, the under-
writer for the bond issue and the bond counsel.
A common sense reading of Penelope's predicament is that Dick and
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Dan Dastardly, acting through their companies, committed securities
fraud that led to Penelope's loss. The casual observer would assume,
then, that Penelope should and would have a remedy through Rule lOb-
5, the federal securities provision that prohibits such fraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities.' The traditional requirements of
Rule lOb-5 in effect well into the 1970s, however, would deny relief to
Penelope and similarly situated plaintiffs. Because Rule lOb-5 was based
on the common law torts of fraud and deceit, courts traditionally re-
quired plaintiffs to have relied directly on the defendant's misrepresenta-
tions to obtain a remedy.2 In the example above, Penelope had not read
the disclosure documents or the press release that contained the defend-
ant's misrepresentations. Because she had not relied directly on the de-
fendants' misrepresentations in those documents, she could not sustain a
cause of action for securities fraud under the traditional interpretation of
Rule lOb-5.
This traditional approach began to change in the 1970s, however, as
many courts and commentators argued that it was misguided and unfair
to condition relief for securities fraud on the plaintiff having read esoteric
disclosure documents that provided little intelligible information to aver-
age investors.' In addition, critics pointed out that the traditional reli-
ance requirement posed burdensome evidentiary4 and procedural'
1. Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the SEC in 1942 under its authority pursuant to
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1989), provides as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly of indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange-
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). Federal courts have consistently inferred a private cause
of action under Rule lOb-5 since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.
Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court first acknowledged the existence of a private cause of
action under Rule lob-5 in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971). Jurisdiction under Rule lOb-5 is exclusively federal. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1988).
2. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965); infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. Law. 631,
631-32 (1973) (stating that disclosure documents were "fairly close to worthless" to the
average investor).
4. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) ("Requiring a plaintiff
to show a speculative state of facts, i.e., how he would have acted if omitted material
information had been disclosed .... or if the misrepresentation had not been made,...
would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule lob-5 plaintiff
who has traded on an impersonal market.") (citations omitted).
5. See, e.g., id. at 242 ("[T]he presumption of reliance created by the fraud-on-the-
FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY
problems that prevented plaintiff-investors from bringing class actions.
Supporters of a revised approach further contended that in litigating
under an anti-fraud statute,6 the focus of the judicial inquiry should be
on the merits of the claim that defendants committed fraud, not collat-
eral evidentiary and procedural inquiries.
By the early 1980s, several circuits supported a theory that permitted
plaintiffs who had not read or directly relied upon the defendant's mis-
statements to recover under Rule lOb-5. 7 This theory, known as fraud
on the market theory, was shaped by two significant influences on securi-
ties law: the efficient capital market hypothesis and federal class action
procedure.8 The efficient capital market hypothesis states that in open
and actively traded markets, a security's price fully reflects all available,
material information relating to that security.9 The hypothesis assumes
that efficient markets quickly absorb new information and incorporate
this information into a security's price.' 0 As a result, a plaintiff should be
able to rely on the integrity of the market to price securities accurately.II
In the example above, the market reacted to Dick Dastardly's misrepre-
sentations in the disclosure documents and press release by incorporating
the positive news into the stock price, which then rose to an artificially
inflated $35 per share. Then, when those misrepresentations were re-
vealed, the stock quickly dropped to $10 per share. Fraud on the market
theory uses the efficient capital market hypothesis to explain how the
defendant's misrepresentations caused a plaintiff's loss without requiring
market theory provided 'a practical resolution to the problem of balancing the substan-
tive requirement of proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural requisites
of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.' "); see also Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market:
A Criticism of Dispensing With Reliance Requirements In Certain Open Market Transac-
tions, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 435, 439-41 (1984) (arguing that fraud on the market appropri-
ately relaxes the reliance requirement to meet the procedural requirements of class
certification).
6. Rule lOb-5 was enacted to combat fraud in the securities markets. During the
discussion concerning the adoption of Rule lOb-5, Commissioner Sumner Pike infa-
mously deadpanned, "Well, we are against fraud, aren't we?" Foreword, 61 Fordham L.
Rev. Si, S2 (1993) (remarks of Milton Freeman recalling the statement of Commissioner
Sumner Pike during the decision to adopt Rule lOb-5).
7. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102(1983); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1975).
8. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988); Barbara Black, The Strange
Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in Search of a Theory, 52 Alb. L. Rev. 923, 927
(1988); Bruce D. Cohen, Note, Dredging the Shores Doctrine: Trends in the Fraud-on-the-
Market Theory in the New Issues Context, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 731, 731-33 (1989); John
Schmidt, Note, The Fraud-Created-the Market Theory: The Presumption of Reliance in
the Primary Issue Context, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 495, 496-97 (1991).
9. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Marketr A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 413-16 (1970). For an analysis of the efficient capital market hy-
pothesis, see infra notes 27-60 and accompanying text.
10. See Fama, supra note 9, at 413-16.
11. See id
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a showing of direct reliance. 2 Fraud on the market theory also furthers
the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by facilitating class
actions, since it helps eliminate individual issues of reliance that tend to
make securities fraud class actions impracticable. 3 As discussed in de-
tail below, the Supreme Court embraced the fraud on the market theory
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. 4
Despite the acceptance of fraud on the market theory, most courts
remain faithful to Rule lOb-5's origins in tort law and retain reliance as
an essential element a Rule lob-5 claim.' 5 Courts explain fraud on the
market as granting plaintiffs a presumption of reliance, establishing a
prima facie case that defendants may rebut.' 6 For example, if Penelope
purchased Dastardly, Inc. stock in reliance on her belief that the com-
pany was about to be taken over at a huge premium, actual knowledge of
the defendant's misrepresentations in the disclosure documents would
not have affected her investment decision. In this case, defendants could
rebut the fraud on the market's presumption of reliance upon positive
proof that the misrepresentations were irrelevant to Penelope's invest-
ment decision and that she would have bought the stock even if she had
known about the misrepresentations.' 7 But critics of the theory claim
that, in practice, fraud on the market effectively eliminates the reliance
requirement. Instead, it establishes a recovery scheme of "pure causa-
tion," thereby creating an investor's insurance policy that conditions re-
covery solely on plaintiff's loss.'"
So far, the discussion has focused on the fraud on the market theory as
it would be applied in Penelope's cause of action based on her purchase
of Dastardly, Inc. stock. But Penelope also filed a suit against Do Good,
Inc. based on her purchase of the new issue revenue bonds. Courts rec-
ognize a difference between these two causes of action. 19 While Penelope
12. See id.
13. The "common questions of fact" element of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires that
questions of law or fact common to all members of the class must predominate over
questions affecting only individual class members for purposes of class certification. See
Basic, 485 U.S. at 242; Black, supra note 5, at 440.
14. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
15. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243. For an examination of the relationship between the
reliance requirement of Rule lOb-5 and fraud on the market theory, see infra notes 62-
127 and accompanying text.
16. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
17. The defendants misrepresentations were the 'but for' cause but not the proximate
cause of her loss.
18. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 256 & n.7 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 733 (1Ith Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, I., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 486 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Randall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). Some commentators, how-
ever, favor the pure causation approach. See Black, supra note 8, at 926 (1988) ("An
alternative explanation of fraud on the market is that it eliminates reliance as a required
element and places the analytical emphasis where it belongs: on causation.... [F]raud
on the market is best conceptualized in terms of this pure causation approach instead of
the more frequently used reliance approach.").
19. See, e.g., Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 198-200 (6th Cir.
S154 [Vol. 61
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purchased the Dastardly, Inc. stock in a secondary market, she
purchased the revenue bonds from Do Good Inc. in a "primary" or "new
issues" market. Primary markets handle new issues of previously non-
existent securities while secondary markets trade existing securities in an
open market.2° The Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson endorsed a
version of the fraud on the market theory in the context of an efficient,
secondary market.21
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Basic, however, courts strug-
gled to define the proper scope of the fraud on the market theory.' It
was during this period that the Fifth Circuit, in Shores v. Sklar,' devel-
oped a variation of the fraud on the market theory to allow the presump-
tion of reliance in the primary market or new issues context.24 Even
though the plaintiffs in Shores traded on an inefficient market, the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiff class was entitled to a presumption of reli-
ance when they could show that the defendants issued securities that
were "not entitled to be marketed" and that were part of an overall
scheme to defraud investors.25 There exists considerable controversy as
to whether the fraud on the market theory should extend to securities,
such as Dan Dastardly's revenue bonds, that are issued in primary
markets. 26
This Note explores the extension of fraud on the market theory to the
context of newly issued securities. Part I of this Note examines the de-
velopment and validity of the fraud on the market theory, concentrating
on its relationship to two important principles that animate the theory:
the efficient capital market hypothesis and the reliance requirement of
Rule lOb-5. Part II examines how courts have extended fraud on the
market theory to the primary market context. Part III critically reflects
on arguments for and against applying the rebuttable presumption of re-
1990) (distinguishing as two distinct causes of action Basic's fraud on the market claim
and Shores' fraud created the market claim).
20. Primary markets are undeveloped and inefficient. For the implications on market
efficiency of the distinction between primary and secondary markets, see infra notes 27-61
and accompanying text.
21. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243-45.
22. For a discussion of the development of fraud on the market theory in well-devel-
oped, secondary markets, see infra notes 62-127 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the development of fraud on the market in undeveloped, primary markets, see infra
notes 128-206 and accompanying text.
23. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
24. See id at 468-72.
25. See id.
26. Compare Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud
Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1, 12 (1982) (suggesting that
other courts not adopt the holding of Shores) and Martin J. Stanek, Comment, The Fraud
on the Market Theory: The Debate Rages On, 27 Duq. L. Rev. 277, 293 (1989) (calling
Shores decision "indefensible") and Note, The Fraud-On-The-Market Theory, 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 1143, 1157-58 (1982) (rejecting possible rationale for Shores) with Cohen, supra
note 8, at 760-62 (arguing for the validity of fraud created the market theory) and
Schmidt, supra note 8, at 528-31 (same).
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liance supported by fraud on the market theory to newly issued securi-
ties. Finally, the Note concludes that the fraud on the market theory's
rebuttable presumption of reliance should not extend to newly issued
securities.
I. BACKGROUND: FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY
As introduced above, there are two concepts critical to a full under-
standing of whether the fraud on the market theory should extend to
context of newly issued securities: the efficient capital market hypothesis
and the reliance requirement under Rule lOb-5. This background section
examines the relationship of these two concepts to the development of
fraud on the market theory.
A. Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
The theoretical underpinning of fraud on the market theory is the effi-
cient capital market hypothesis.27 An efficient securities market is one
that rapidly reflects new information in a security's price without bias:
the more rapidly the market incorporates new information into a secur-
ity's price, the more efficient the market.2" In a fully efficient market,29
an investor cannot achieve investment returns greater than the market
average through securities research."0 A policy of throwing darts at the
New York Times stock listings and passively holding the chosen securities
over time would lead to returns that are equivalent to an investment
strategy based on active research and trading that seeks out undervalued
securities and capitalizes on market trends.3"
27. See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 907, 910-12 (1989); L. Brett Lockwood, Comment,
The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory: A Contrarian View, 38 Emory L.J. 1269, 1269-70
(1989); Cohen, supra note 8, at 734-35. See generally Fischel, supra note 26 (explaining
efficient capital market hypothesis' relation to fraud on the market theory).
28. See Fischel, supra note 27, at 911-12; 4 Alan A. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels,
Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud § 8.6 (1988).
29. One commentator states the following:
The paradigm of an efficient securities market is often viewed as one in which
transaction costs are zero; all investors have instantaneous access to all relevant
information, and all investors agree on the implications of this information....
[Efficient market enthusiasts believe that] conditions in actual securities mar-
kets parallel the paradigmatic conditions closely enough so that an efficient
market mechanism is at work in... actual markets.
See Lockwood, supra note 27, at 1303-04 (footnotes omitted).
30. See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1978). Under
this definition of the hypothesis referred to as "trading-rule efficiency," a market is effi-
cient if it is impossible to devise a trading rule that systematically outperforms the market
absent possession of inside information. Another definition of the hypothesis, "value effi-
ciency," "focuses on the extent to which security prices reflect the present value of the net
cash flows generated by a firm's assets." Fischel, supra note 27, at 913.
31. See Fischel, supra note 27, at 915. Though the hypothesis posits that securities
research is unnecessary because the market is efficient, the market will remain efficient
only if most market participants believe that to be false and engage in research. Marginal
S156 [Vol. 61
FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY
The semistrong version32 of the hypothesis holds that the market price
of a given security will quickly reflect all relevant, publicly available in-
formation.3 3 The semistrong version of the hypothesis provides a theo-
retically coherent and empirically tested 34 mechanism to substantiate the
central premise of the fraud on the market theory: when a material mis-
representation enters the stream of publicly available information, it is
quickly incorporated into the security's market price, artificially inflating
(or, less typically, deflating) that price.35 Thus, because markets incorpo-
rate all publicly available information into a security's price, investors
should be able to reasonably rely on the market to price securities accu-
rately.36 The hypothesis validates the fraud on the market plaintiff's
claim that the defendant's misrepresentation caused the plaintiff's injury
even though plaintiff did not directly rely on the misrepresentations.37
Note that the difference between traditional face-to-face exchanges of
goods and transactions involving actively traded securities in efficient
markets is the presence or absence of reliable market prices reflecting
information possessed by diverse sets of traders and analysts.38 Where
such a mechanism does not exist, as in transactions outside an efficient
market, it is not reasonable to rely on the offer price as incorporating
relevant information about the value of the underlying asset. 39
Given the importance of the efficient market hypothesis as a founda-
tion for fraud on the market theory," it is essential to determine whether
profits may be attainable when markets react to new information and move toward the
new equilibrium point of efficiency. See Lockwood, supra note 27, at 1304.
32. There are three versions of the hypothesis-weak, semistrong, and strong-that
reflect the efficiency of the market with respect to a given set of information. The weak
form of the hypothesis holds that the market incorporates past price movements into a
security's present price. A trading scheme that depends on knowledge of a stock's past
price movements to predict future prices, e.g., the chartists on Wall Street, cannot lead to
investment returns above the market average since the information is already reflected in
the stock's price. The semistrong version, discussed in the text, holds that the market
price of a stock reflects all publicly available information. The strong version holds that a
security's market price incorporates all information from whatever source, including in-
side information. The strong version predicts that an individual with inside information
could not outperform average market returns because such information already is re-
flected in market price. The acknowledged profitability of insider trading suggests that
the strong form of the theory is not correct in practice. See Fischel, supra note 27, at 911;
Lockwood, supra note 27, at 1303 n.165; Cohen, supra note 8, at 735.
33. See Fischel, supra note 27, at 911.
34. Courts adopting the fraud on the market theory have alluded to empirical studies
establishing the validity of the semistrong version. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 246 & n.24 (1988).
35. See Fischel, supra note 27, at 911-12.
36. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244-47 (1988).
37. See id; Fischel, supra note 27, at 911-12.
38. See Fischel, supra note 27, at 912.
39. See id
40. See Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 198 (6th Cir. 1990) ("fraud
on the market theory cannot be applied logically to securities that are not traded in effi-
cient markets"); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1121 (5th Cir. 1988) (fraud on
the market theory requires "active, efficient secondary market" for subject securities),
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the security at issue, in fact, traded on an efficient market. Typically,
courts do not directly address the issue; instead, they casually state that
securities that trade on any open,41 actively traded42 and well-devel-
oped43 markets are efficient.' Courts and commentators have noted that
"[t]hese terms are cumulative in the sense that a developed market will
almost always be an open one[, a]nd an efficient market will almost inva-
riably be a developed one."'45 In Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath,46 the
Sixth Circuit, the highest court to address the issue directly, identified
five factors for determining market efficiency:
(1) a large weekly trading volume;47 (2) the existence of a significant
number of reports by securities analysts; 48 (3) the existence of market
makers and arbitrageurs in the security;49 (4) the eligibility of a com-
pany to file an S-3 Registration Statement; 50 and (5) a history of imme-
diate movement of the stock price caused by unexpected corporate
events or financial releases.
5 1
cert denied, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); Stinson v. Van Valley Dev. Corp., 719 F. Supp. 362,
363 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (threshold requirement for fraud on the market presumption is a
showing of an open and developed securities market), afid, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990);
Harman v. LyphoMed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("the question is al-
ways whether the stock trades in an efficient market").
41. "An open market is one in which anyone, or at least a large number of persons,
can buy or sell." Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 n.17 (D.N.J. 1989) (quot-
ing Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 28, § 8.6).
42. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
43. "A developed market is one which has a relatively high level of activity and fre-
quency, and for which trading information (e.g., price and volume) is widely available. It
is principally a secondary market in outstanding securities. It usually, but not necessar-
ily, has continuity and liquidity (the ability to absorb a reasonable amount of trading with
relatively small price changes)." Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1276 n.17 (quoting Bromberg
& Lowenfels, supra note 28, § 8.6).
44. See, ag., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244-47 (1988) (holding that securi-
ties trading on open, active, and well-developed markets are efficient and applying fraud
on the market theory to them).
45. Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1276 n.17 (quoting Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note
28, § 8.6).
46. 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990).
47. Evidence of a large weekly trading volume, an actively traded market for the
stock, signifies substantial investor interest in the security. Investor interest and a high
volume of trading suggests that the market is incorporating newly available corporate
information into the stock price. See id; Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286.
48. Investors rely on these analyst reports in deciding on whether to purchase securi-
ties. These analysts help to quickly disseminate key information throughout the investor
population. See Freeman, 915 F.2d at 199; Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286.
49. These entities ensure the completion of market mechanisms by reacting swiftly to
newly released corporate information by purchasing stock and driving it to a the equilib-
rium price level. See Freeman, 915 F.2d at 199; Cammer, 711 F. Supp at 1286-87.
50. The SEC's rationale for permitting companies to use a Form S-3 is the premise
that the company's stock trades in an efficient market. To qualify for Form S-3 registra-
tion, an issuer must meet several criteria including an aggregate market value of voting
stock held by non-affiliates of at least $150 million, or at least $100 million and an annual
trading volume of at least 3 million shares of such stock. See Freeman, 915 F.2d at 199;
Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1287; Lockwood, supra note 27, at 1315.
51. Freeman, 915 F.2d at 199.
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Commentators have suggested other related factors that courts should
consider in determining market efficiency, including the number of trad-
ers in the security, the number of holders of the security and the number
of outstanding securities.52
Traditionally, the most frequently noted factor courts considered in
determining efficiency was whether the security traded on an exchange
and, if so, which exchange.53 Courts have generally agreed that the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and American Stock Exchange
("AMEX") were efficient markets.5 4 There has been less uniformity,
however, as to whether securities that trade on Over-the-Counter
("OTC") markets were efficient. 5 While most courts and commentators
concurred that the OTC market was generally less efficient than the
NYSE, they agreed that the inquiry to determine efficiency should con-
centrate on the factors, such as those described in Freeman, that indi-
cated whether the market for a particular stock was developed and
active, not simply where the stock traded.56 Additionally, courts have
concluded that primary market (new issue) offerings of securities are not
efficient markets, since prices are set by issuers or underwriters and not
impersonal market forces that result from active trading.5
In 1988, the Supreme Court based its approval of fraud on the market
theory and the efficient capital market hypothesis in Basic v. Levinson on
52. See Lockwood, supra note 27, at 1312.
53. See id, at 1312-13.
54. See Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that
NYSE stock traded on an efficient market), vacated on other grounds, 485 U.S. 224
(1988); Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403,405 (N.D. IM. 1987) (same); Schlanger v.
Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); see also Peil v.
Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1158 (3rd Cir. 1986) (holding that AMEX stock traded on an
efficient market); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 366 (2d Cir. 1981) (same), cerL denied,
458 U.S. 1107 (1982); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 138 (D.NJ.
1984) (same).
55. See Lockwood, supra note 27, at 1313.
56. See Harman v. LyphoMed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.D. hi. 1988) (stating
that the appropriate inquiry for efficiency "remains the development of the market for
that stock, and not the location where the stock trades"); see also John F. Barry III, The
Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1307, 1349 (1981)
("ECMH studies do not support the conclusion that the nation's capital markets are
equally efficient with respect to all types of securities, on all exchanges, at all times.");
Lockwood, supra note 27, at 1313:
By looking only to the trading exchange without evaluating other efficiency-
related criteria, the courts' analysis of the efficient market prong of the fraud-
on-the-market theory may result in overinclusive awards if the courts' allow a
presumption of reliance where the market is not, in fact, sufficiently efficient to
be impacted by a misrepresentation.
57. See, eg., Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990)
("We hold... that a primary market for newly issued municipal bonds as a matter of law
is not efficient."); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 746 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (noting
that primary markets lack a mechanism to price stocks accurately and that they are ineffi-
dent), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); In re Bexar Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 602, 607
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (stating that a primary market "is not efficient or developed under any
definition of these terms").
19931 S159
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the wide acceptance of the efficient capital market hypothesis by the
lower courts, commentators, and researchers. 8 The efficient capital
market hypothesis, however, continues to have many detractors.5 9 Some
commentators have described the recent trend in scholarly literature as
critical of the hypothesis.' Critics point to phenomena that seem to run
counter to the existence, in practice, of efficient markets, such as trading
schemes that outperform the market, the 1987 stock market crash and
corporate takeovers. 6 ' Absent the Supreme Court overturning Basic,
however, courts deciding cases involving securities traded in efficient
markets will continue to grant a presumption of reliance based on the
fraud on the market theory and the efficient capital hypothesis.
B. Fraud on the Market Theory and Relaxing the Rule 10b-5
Reliance Standard
The relationship between fraud on the market theory and Rule lOb-5's
reliance requirement is crucial to the debate regarding the validity of
fraud on the market theory and its extension beyond the context of effi-
cient markets. This Section examines the origin, purpose, and necessity
of Rule lOb-5's reliance requirement in connection with the development
and acceptance of the fraud on the market theory.
1. Development of the Fraud on the Market Theory
The private right of action under Rule lOb-5 was based on the com-
mon law torts of fraud and deceit.62 To recover in fraud at common law,
a plaintiff must establish that the misrepresentation or omission at issue
is the proximate or legal cause of plaintiff's injury.63 To do this, the
58. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988).
59. See Stephan F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and Martingales, 27 J. Econ. Lit.
1583, 1616 (1989) ("The evidence suggests that, contrary to the assertion of this version
of the efficient market theory, such large discrepancies between price and fundamental
value regularly occur."); William K. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is
Not Efficient, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 341 (1986) (arguing against the efficient market
hypothesis); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Infor-
mation, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761 (1985) (same).
60. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Govern-
ance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187, 198 (1991) ("In
recent years, however, the efficient capital markets theory has become increasingly dis-
credited, especially since the stock market crash of October 1987."); Lockwood, supra
note 27, at 1302 ("In the past decade, however, the hypothesis has come under increasing
criticism based on further empirical studies and logical analysis of the processes underly-
ing the theory.").
61. See Lipton & Rosenblaum, supra note 60, at 198-200; Fischel, supra note 27, at
913; Lockwood, supra note 27, at 1305.
62. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 255 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980); Peil v.
Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986). See generally Louis Loss, Fundamentals of
Securities Regulation 699-723 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the common law tort background
of Rule lOb-5).
63. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1976); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser
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plaintiff must establish both reliance on a misrepresentation' and the
loss caused by that reliance.65 The purpose of the reliance requirement is
to establish causation in fact.66 That is, plaintiff must establish that the
misrepresentation was the legal cause of plaintiff's loss by establishing
that the loss reasonably resulted from plaintiff's reliance on the misrepre-
67sentation or omission.
In List v. Fashion Park Inc.,6 the seminal modem case on reliance in
the Rule lOb-5 context, the court held that the plaintiff established reli-
ance when the defendant's misrepresentation was a substantial factor in
determining the course of conduct that resulted in the plaintiff's loss. 6
9
As in the common law fraud context, the purpose of the reliance require-
ment in a Rule lOb-5 action has been to provide the necessary causal
nexus between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's in-
jury.7° Subsequent to the List decision, courts began to develop modifica-
tions to the strict direct reliance requirement that were aimed at
overcoming what would otherwise be virtually insurmountable obstacles
for plaintiffs.71 Additionally, the Supreme Court acknowledged that im-
personal and complex modem security's markets differed from the sim-
ple, direct transactions contemplated by the early fraud cases and that
courts should consider those differences in applying the reliance require-
ment of Rule lOb-5.72 With this in mind, some courts began to grant
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser and
Keeton].
64. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1976); Prosser
and Keeton, supra note 63, § 105, at 728.
65. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 537 (1976); Prosser & Keeton, supra note 63,
§ 110, at 765.
66. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 546 (1976); Prosser & Keeton, supra note 63,
§ 110, at 767. Causation in fact is established if the misrepresentation induced the plain-
tiff to enter into the transaction. See id.
67. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 548A (1976); Prosser & Keeton, supra note
63, § 110, at 767.
68. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
69. See id. at 462; see also Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 474 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting
List, 340 F.2d at 462), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir.) (quoting List, 340 F.2d at 462), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971).
70. See List, 340 F.2d at 462. Materiality and reliance combine to establish that the
defendant's misrepresentation caused the plaintiff's loss. Materiality is the objective test
of causation and depends on whether the misrepresented or omitted information would
have been a substantial factor in a reasonable person's decision to buy or sell securities.
Reliance, on the other hand, comprises the subjective component of causation and de-
pends on whether the plaintiff himself considered the information in making his invest-
ment decision. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, Securities Law Handbook § 14.01, at 437
(1990).
71. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
72. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1988); see also Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983) (stating that Rule lOb-5 actions are
designed in part to add to the protections provided to investors by the common law); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975) (stating that Rule lOb-5
actions are distinct from common law deceit and misrepresentation claims).
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plaintiffs in special circumstances a presumption of reliance."
Courts initially recognized a presumption of reliance only in cases of
total nondisclosure or omission of material fact.74 The plaintiff in an
omissions case has a more difficult evidentiary burden to bear than a
plaintiff in an affirmative misrepresentation case, since the plaintiff in the
omission's case must show a speculative state of facts, i.e., how the plain-
tiff would have acted if defendant had disclosed the omitted informa-
tion.75 Courts reasoned that it was easier to prove direct reliance on an
affirmative misstatement because the plaintiff could point to the misstate-
ment and explain how it affected the plaintiff's investment decisions.76
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 77 and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States78 are the watershed cases in relaxing the strict standard of direct
reliance. 79 In Mills, defendant Auto-Lite's shareholders sued to set aside
a proposed merger between Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler Linotype Com-
pany under SEC Rule 14a-9, which prohibited misrepresentations in
proxy solicitations.8 " The Supreme Court held that plaintiff-shareholders
need not show direct reliance on defendant's misrepresentations or omis-
sions in proxy statements if such misrepresentations were material. 81 In-
stead, the proof of materiality of the proxy solicitation itself, rather than
individual reliance 2 on the defect in the solicitation materials, provided
the required causal link in the transaction. 3 Thus, Mills eliminated the
direct reliance requirement in actions under Rule 14a-9 concerning mate-
rial misstatements or omissions in proxy materials.8 4
73. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (justifying
presumption of reliance where defendant breaches duty to disclose material information);
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970) (presuming reliance upon show-
ing of materiality where proxy solicitation itself, rather than defect in the solicitation
materials, served as the essential link in the transaction); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974) (presuming reliance where plaintiff is an unwill-
ing seller of securities in a market manipulated by defendant), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975).
74. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54.
75. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245.
76. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54.
77. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
78. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
79. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988); Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 374 (2d Cir.) (citing Mills and Ute in holding that reliance
could be presumed, i.e., "constructive reliance," upon proof of materiality of the omitted
facts), cert denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
80. See Mills, 396 U.S. at 378. Defendant Auto-Lite had sent out a proxy statement
to the plaintiff-shareholders that stated that Auto-Lite's board of directors approved of
the merger, but neglected to reveal that the bidder, Mergenthaler Linotype Company,
was already the majority shareholder of Auto-Lite and had nominated every member of
the board. See id.
81. See id. at 385.
82. See id. at 382 n.5 ("Proof of actual reliance by thousands of individuals would...
not be feasible ... and reliance on the nondisclosure of a fact is a particularly difficult
matter to define or prove.").
83. See id. at 384-85.
84. See id.
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In Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court applied similar reasoning regard-
ing the direct reliance requirement in omissions cases to the Rule lOb-5
context. The defendants in Affiliated Ute, market makers in the stock of
a company holding assets for certain native Americans and sales agents
for the native Americans, had remained silent as to prevailing market
prices for the stock in circumstances in which they had a duty to disclose
those prices.s The Supreme Court ruled that the Tenth Circuit had
erred when it held that there was no violation of Rule lOb-5 unless the
record disclosed evidence that the plaintiffs had directly relied on the
material factual misrepresentations made by the defendants."6 The
Court drew a distinction between misstatements and omissions under
Rule 10b-5(b), which required direct reliance, and activities under Rule
10b-5(a) and (c) that constituted a "course of business" or "device,
scheme, or artifice," both of which merited a presumption of reliance.8 7
Specifically, the Court held that under the circumstances of Affiliated
Ute, in which there was a failure to disclose material facts in the face of a
duty to disclose, positive proof of direct reliance was not a requirement
for recovery.88 Later cases have interpreted the presumption of reliance
recognized in Affiliated Ute as rebuttable.8 9
Two years after Affiliated Ute, the Second Circuit addressed the reli-
ance requirement in a different context in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp.90 In Schlick, the plaintiff did not allege fraud in his purchase of a
security; instead, he alleged that a fraudulent proxy statement was one
step in a scheme that led to the forced liquidation of his security.9 ' The
Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the Rule lOb-5
and Rule 14a claims, emphasizing the nontypical nature of the case.92
Typically, recovery on a lOb-5 claim required a showing of both loss
causation and transaction causation (causation and reliance, respec-
tively).93 The Schlick court carved out a limited exception to this re-
85. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 146-47 (1972).
86. See id. at 152.
87. See id at 152-53.
88. See iL at 153-54 ("This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material
fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.").
89. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988); Lipton v. Documation,
Inc. 734 F.2d 740, 742 n.3 (llth. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); Rifkin v.
Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1978).
90. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
91. See Schlick, 507 F.2d at 381.
92. See id. at 383-84.
93. "Many courts use the terms 'transaction causation' and 'loss causation' instead of
reliance and causation, respectively." Black, supra note 5, at 435 n.2; accord In re Cat-
anella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1414 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("Stripped of fancy nomenclature, trans-
action causation is the reliance element in a section 10(b) case."); see also Robert N.
Rapp, Rule lOb-5 and "Fraud-on-the-Market"--Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 861, 865 n.21 (1982) (" 'Transaction causation' turns upon a direct
causal connection between the transaction complained of and the offending act. 'Loss
causation' means only that nexus between the offending act and the economic harm ex-
ists."). Some commentators feel that the distinction between loss causation and transac-
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quirement in cases where the plaintiff alleged a scheme to defraud that
included market manipulation and a merger on preferential terms, of
which the proxy documents were only one part.9 4 Further, in the case at
hand, the defendant's misrepresentations and omissions in the proxy
statement were irrelevant to the plaintiff's investment decision, since the
defendant's manipulation of the market caused a forced sale by plain-
tiffs.95 Thus, the Schlick court specifically held that when a plaintiff al-
leged that a loss had resulted from a fraudulent scheme to bring about a
forced sale of the plaintiff's securities, the plaintiff need not plead or
prove direct reliance (transaction causation) because the plaintiff had, in
fact, made no investment decision.96
In Blackie v. Barrack,97 the Ninth Circuit extended the presumption of
reliance recognized in omissions cases, such as Affiliated Ute, and forced
seller cases, such as Schlick, to affirmative misrepresentation cases under
the fraud on the market rationale.98 In Blackie, the Ninth Circuit found
that the requirement of direct reliance by each shareholder in the context
of a large class action proceeding was an unreasonable and unnecessary
evidentiary burden.99 The court held that in the context of an imper-
sonal stock exchange on a developed market, a prima facie case of reli-
ance was adequately established by (1) the proof of the purchase of the
security, and (2) the proof of the materiality of the defendant's misrepre-
sentation. 10 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that when plaintiff met
tion causation adds nothing but confusion to the analysis of the reliance requirement in
Rule 10b-5 cases. See Black, supra note 5, at 436 n.2. But see Roger R. Crane, An
Analysis of Causation Under Rule lOb-5, 9 Sec. Reg. L.J. 99, 100 (1981) (advocating the
use of these terms in analysis of Rule lOb-5 claims).
94. See Schlick, 507 F.2d at 381.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 380-81; accord Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787,
797 (2d Cir. 1969) ("[W]here the success of a fraud does not require an exercise of voli-
tion by the plaintiff, but instead requires an exercise of volition by other persons, there
need be no showing that the plaintiff himself relied upon the deception."), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 822 (1970); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.)
("Whatever need there may be to show reliance in other situations [citing List and other
cases], we regard it as unnecessary in the limited instance when no volitional sale is re-
quired and the result of a forced sale is exactly that intended by the wrongdoer."), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
97. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
98. In Blackie, the plaintiff class, consisting of thousands of stockholders that had
purchased or sold Ampex Corporation stock on the NYSE, alleged that the defendants
made fraudulent misrepresentations in approximately forty-five publicly released docu-
ments, including Ampex's annual and quarterly reports, press releases, and other SEC
documents. The plaintiffs alleged that the market, acting efficiently, artificially inflated
Ampex's stock price when it incorporated the misrepresentations and omissions over the
27 month class period. The defendants resisted class certification, however, arguing that
Rule lOb-5's requirement of direct proof of subjective reliance by each class member
would inevitably create sufficient conflicts between class members and the named plain-
tiffs that would render their representation of the class inadequate. See id. at 902-05.
99. See id. at 907; supra note 4 and accompanying text.
100. See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906.
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these criteria, it shifted the burden of disproving reliance to the
defendant.10 '
2. Acceptance by the Supreme Court: Basic v. Levinson
In Basic Inc v. Levinson,' °2 the Supreme Court adopted the fraud on
the market theory in the context of efficient markets. Basic Inc., a pub-
licly traded company on the NYSE, was involved in merger negotiations
with a suitor, Combustion Engineering, from September 1976 through
December 1978.103 Rumors of the possible takeover caused the price and
trading volume of Basic stock to increase throughout this period."°
During this period, however, Basic issued three statements denying
knowledge of any reason for the stock's upward activity and specifically
denying the existence of the merger negotiations.0 5 In December 1978,
Basic notified the NYSE that it had been approached concerning a
merger; it approved Combustion's tender offer the next day.106 The
plaintiff class consisting of stockholders who had sold their shares during
the class period"0 7 alleged that defendant Basic and its directors artifi-
cially depressed the price of Basic stock throughout the class period,
thereby injuring plaintiffs who sold their stock at depressed prices. 0 I In
its opinion, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the pre-
liminary merger discussions were material and whether the district court
properly applied a presumption of reliance supported by the fraud on the
market theory.
After speaking for an undivided court on the issue of materiality, Jus-
tice Blackmun could muster only a plurality for the Court's resolution of
the issue of reliance and the fraud on the market theory."°9 At the out-
set, Blackmun explained that his task was not to assess the general valid-
101. See id. Defendants could rebut the presumption "(1) by disproving materiality or
by proving that, despite materiality, an insufficient number of traders relied to inflate the
price; [or] (2) by proving that an individual plaintiff purchased despite knowledge of the
falsity of a representation, or that he would have, had he known of it." Id. The court did
acknowledge, however, that defendant's right to disprove causation was of limited value
since it would be difficult to convince a jury that plaintiffs were indifferent to material
fraud. See iL at 906 n.22.
102. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
103. See id at 227-28.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 227-28 & n.4.
106. See id. at 227-28.
107. Pursuant to the strong form of the efficient capital market hypothesis, the com-
plaint sought to certify all investors who sold stock between October 1, 1976, the day
negotiations for the merger started, and December 20, 1978. The district court, however,
certified only plaintiffs who sold stock after the first misleading announcement validating
the semistrong form of the hypothesis. See id at 228 n.5.
108. See id at 228. It was not necessary to allege that plaintiffs lost money in absolute
terms on their investment in Basic stock. In fact, since Basie's stock price was rising
throughout the period, most plaintiffs made money when they sold their stock. See id. at
260 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy took no part in the
decision. See id. at 250.
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ity of the theory, but to consider whether it was proper for the court to
apply a rebuttable presumption of reliance that was supported in part by
the fraud on the market theory.' 10
Justice Blackmun first reiterated that reliance is an independent ele-
ment of a Rule lOb-5 action, providing the causal connection between
defendant's misrepresentations and plaintiff's injury. I I' Citing Mills and
Affiliated Ute, Blackmun pointed out that Supreme Court precedent in-
dicated ways to prove causation without requiring positive proof of reli-
ance.1" 2 Blackmun further explained that the Court's understanding of
reliance must reflect the differences between modem securities transac-
tions and the face-to-face transactions that gave rise to the requirements
of common law fraud.' ' Based on considerations of fairness, public pol-
icy, probability, and judicial economy, Blackmun acknowledged that
plaintiffs who allege fraud in an open and well-developed market should
benefit from a rebuttable presumption of reliance. 14 As further support
for his position, Blackmun cited empirical studies supporting the efficient
capital market hypothesis.' 5 The Court implicitly accepted the semis-
trong version 1 6 of efficient capital market hypothesis when it stated that
the Court will presume plaintiff's reliance on any public material misrep-
resentation because most publicly available information was reflected in a
stock's price. 17 Blackmun emphasized, however, that reliance was still
an element of Rule lOb-5 and that any showing that severed the link
between the defendant's misrepresentation and, either the price received
(or paid) by plaintiff or the plaintiff's decision to trade at a fair market
price, would be sufficient to rebut the presumption.I"
In dissent, Justice White joined the plurality in rejecting those wider
versions of fraud on the market embraced by lower courts that he felt
equated causation with reliance and allowed recovery notwithstanding
110. See id. at 242.
111. See id. at 243.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 243-45 (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986);
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976);
In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
114. See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 245-46. To invoke the rebuttable presumption of reli-
ance, plaintiff must allege and prove the following: defendant made public, material mis-
representations that would induce a reasonable, relying investor to misjudge the value of
the shares that traded on an efficient market between the time the misrepresentations
were made and the time the truth was revealed. See id. at 248 n.27.
115. See id. at 246 & n.24.
116. For a discussion of the difference between the weak, semistrong, and strong ver-
sions of the efficient capital market hypothesis, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
117. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
118. Specifically in Basic, defendants could rebut the presumption by (1) showing that
market makers were privy to the truth about merger negotiations so that the misrepresen-
tations would not have affected market price; (2) news of the merger credibly entered into
the market dissipating the effect of the misrepresentations; (3) stockholders who even if
they had known of the negotiations would have sold their stock because of other con-
cerns, e.g, potential anti-trust problems or political pressure. See id. at 248-49.
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positive proof of the plaintiff's nonreliance." 9 While the majority reiter-
ated the importance of reliance as an element of a Rule lOb-5 claims and
emphasized the rebuttable nature of the fraud on the market theory's
presumption of reliance, White argued that the chance of a defendant
actually rebutting the presumption in practice was virtually impossible in
all but the most extraordinary case. 120 Consequently, the majority's re-
jection of the pure causation version of the fraud on the market theory
rings hollow, for it created a de facto irrebuttable presumption of
reliance. 121
Continuing in dissent, Justice White claimed that courts lack the ex-
pertise to judge the merits of incorporating novel economic theories into
Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence.12 2 He argued that Congress, with its superior
resources and expertise, was far better equipped than the federal courts
to determine how modem economic theory should modify the estab-
lished legal norms of fraud.12 White further argued that courts are in no
position to sanction the distinction that fraud on the market plaintiffs
draw between the market price of a stock and the "integrity of the
price"-the "true value" at which the stock would trade absent defend-
ant's misrepresentations. 124
Justice White also argued that an examination of congressional intent
militated against adoption of the fraud on the market theory. 125 Further,
he claimed that permitting recovery to plaintiffs who made no effort to
read disclosure documents was inconsistent with the congressionally
adopted policy favoring disclosure as the main protective device for in-
vestors.1 26 White concluded that courts should limit their role in inter-
119. See icL at 251 nn.2-3 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268-71 (9th Cir. 1979); Arthur Young & Co. v.
United States District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 694-95 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977); Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Abrams v. Johns
Manville Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,348, at
92,156 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1981).
120. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 256 n.7 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (citing Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906-07 n.22 (9th Cir. 1975), cerL denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976) and In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
121. See id. at 256-57 & 256 n.7. The theory acts as an investor's insurance scheme
allowing recovery based upon plaintiff's showing that they sold stock at a lower price
than what might have been. See id,
122. See id. at 253 ("with no staff economists, no experts schooled in the 'eflicient-
capital-market hypothesis,' no ability to test the validity of empirical market studies, we
are not well equipped to embrace novel constructions of a statute based on contemporary
microeconomic theory.").
123. See id. at 254.
124. See iL at 255.
125. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see infra notes 248-53 and accompa-
nying text.
126. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Justice White cites com-
mentators and judges favorable to this view. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 259 (citing Black,
supra note 5, at 457-59 (arguing that fraud on the market is at odds with congressionally
sanctioned disclosure policy); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 483 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall,
J., dissenting) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983)).
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preting Rule lOb-5 to giving effect to the policy decisions made by
Congress. 127
II. FRAUD ON THE MARKET IN THE NEW ISSUES CONTEXT
Although the Supreme Court in Basic limited its analysis of fraud on
the market to actively traded, well-developed markets, lower courts had
applied and have continued to apply the fraud on the market's presump-
tion of reliance in wider contexts-including primary markets.128 Courts
and commentators dubbed the primary market's version of the theory
"fraud created the market."129 As early as 1977, the Ninth Circuit rec-
ognized a presumption of reliance in a primary or new issues market. 3 °
In Shores v. Sklar, 31 the Fifth Circuit went further and expressly en-
dorsed a version of the fraud on the market theory in a primary market
for revenue bonds. The Shores decision sparked a controversy over the
nature of the fraud on the market theory between (1) those who felt fraud
on the market was a specific theory depending for its validity on the effi-
cient capital market hypothesis, and (2) those who believed fraud on the
market was a more general idea that encompassed any theory that
granted investors a presumption of reliance for Rule lOb-5 purposes. 132
This section examines how the lower courts have extended the fraud on
the market theory, analyzed in Section I, to the primary market or new
issues context.
A. Shores v. Sklar
In Shores v. Sklar, the Fifth Circuit extended the fraud on the market
theory to a primary market involving a new issue of revenue bonds.
Prior to Shores, however, the Ninth Circuit had extended the presump-
tion of reliance to the context of a primary market for oil and gas limited
partnerships. In that case, Arthur Young & Co. v. United States District
Court,13 3 the defendant had sold limited partnership interests in oil and
gas exploration ventures to members of the plaintiff class pursuant to an
allegedly misleading registration statement filed with the SEC.' The
Ninth Circuit found that misrepresentations and omissions in disclosure
materials in an undeveloped, primary market merited a similar presump-
tion of reliance that the Ninth Circuit had granted to the plaintiffs in
Blackie v. Barrack in a developed market two years earlier. 35 Specifi-
127. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 259.
128. See infra notes 134-206 and accompanying text.
129. See Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990);
Schmidt, supra note 8, at 495.
130. See Arthur Young & Co. v. United States District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 694-95
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
131. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
132. See id. at 474.
133. 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
134. See id. at 688.
135. See id.
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cally, the court substituted the primary market investor's reliance on the
"integrity of the regulatory process" and the truth of any statement made
to regulatory agencies during the securities' issuance for the developed
market investor's reliance on the integrity of the market to price securi-
ties accurately. 36 Thus, the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed under
the theory that the reliance requirement was satisfied by the petitioners
reliance on the integrity of the regulatory process.1 31
In Shores, the Fifth Circuit directly addressed the application of the
fraud on the market theory to a primary market. 13  Applying novel 139
and disputed"4 reasoning in the fraud on the market context, a closely
divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, distinguished between a mis-
representation claim under Rule lOb-5(b) and a more generalized scheme
to defraud claim under Rule l0b-5(a) and (c).' 41 The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judge-
ment as to the plaintiff's Rule lOb-5(b) affirmative misrepresentation
claim based on misstatements and omissions in the offering circular,
holding that Rule 10b-5(b) required plaintiffs to plead direct reliance to
state a claim. 42 The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgement as to plaintiff's Rule l0b-5(a) (scheme to
defraud) and (c) (fraudulent course of action) claims.' 43 The court ex-
plained that while Rule 10b-5(b) referred to misrepresentations and
omissions, the language of clauses (a) and (c) was broader.' Since the
affirmative misrepresentations in the offering circular at issue here were
part of a more general scheme to defraud investors, the lack of reliance
on the offering circular, one specific part of the scheme, was not determi-
136. See id. at 689, 694-95.
137. See id. at 695 ("[T~he purchaser of an original issue security relies, at least indi-
rectly, on the integrity of the regulatory process and the truth of any representations
made to the appropriate agencies and the investors at the time of the original issue.").
138. In Shores, the plaintiff class of investors purchased revenue bonds issued by the
Industrial Revenue Board of Frisco City, Alabama, to finance the construction of a mo-
bile home manufacturing plant. The plaintiff class alleged that, throughout the issuance
process, defendants Alabama Supply and Equipment Company ("ASECo"), Investors
Associates, ASECo's underwriter, and Jerald H. Sklar, ASECo's bond counsel, made
numerous misrepresentations concerning the business experience and competence of
ASECo that included overstating ASECo's assets and its ability to support the project.
Sklar incorporated many of the misrepresentations and omissions into the offering circu-
lar. The class plaintiff, Clarence E. Bishop, Jr., neither saw the offering circular nor knew
that one existed. The district court granted summary judgement for defendants because
the class plaintiff did not read the offering circular. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462,
463-67 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
139. See icL at 472 (Randall, J., dissenting) ("The majority opinion today adopts a new
theory of recovery in federal court under Rule lob-5.").
140. See, eg., Fischel, supra note 26, at 12 (suggesting that other courts not adopt the
holding of Shores); Stanek, supra note 26, at 293 (Shores decision "indefensible").
141. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 469; supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
142. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 468.
143. See id. at 468-69.
144. See id. at 468-70.
1993] S169
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW[
native.145 Thus, the plaintiff stated a claim under Rule I Ob-5(a) and (c)'s
generalized anti-fraud language.
The Fifth Circuit formulated a standard for granting a plaintiff the
presumption of reliance in the primary market context. It held that in-
vestors could rely on the market to preclude securities that, but for de-
fendants' fraud, were not "entitled to be marketed."'14 6 To recover,
plaintiff must show the following:
(1) the defendants knowingly conspired to bring securities onto the
market which were not entitled to be marketed, intending to defraud
purchasers, (2) [plaintiff] reasonably relied on the [blonds' availability
on the market as an indication of their apparent genuineness, and (3)
as a result of the scheme to defraud, [plaintiff] suffered a loss. 14 7
Thus, if plaintiffs alleged a generalized scheme to defraud investors that
was not limited to misstatements in the disclosure documents, a lack of
direct reliance on those documents would not preclude recovery. 4
Judge Randall's dissent in Shores argued that the majority opinion was
completely without supporting precedent and that it conflicted with prior
decisions of the Fifth Circuit, other circuits, and analogous Supreme
Court decisions. " Moreover, Judge Randall believed that even if the
majority was pronouncing ex cathedra, its novel holding was the product
of poor legal reasoning and unwise policy.'5 0 The dissent maintained
that the majority took a garden variety affirmative misrepresentation case
and recast it as a generalized scheme to defraud case under Rule lOb-5(a)
and (c) on the basis of an alternative theory of relief in the complaint not
argued at the district court level.' The dissent further argued that the
plaintiff's entire case should be dismissed under Rule lOb-5(b); alterna-
tively, even if the claim proceeded under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), it should
be dismissed.
Judge Randall claimed that the only direct precedent that the majority
cited for its novel proposition for relief was the sweeping and generalized
anti-fraud language under Rule lOb-5(a) and (C).152 The dissent used the
cases that the majority opinion mentioned collaterally-Affiliated Ute,'I 3
Ri[kin,' Blackie"5' and Schlick' 6 -to show that the majority's formu-
145. See id, at 469.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 469-70 (footnote omitted).
148. See id.
149. See id. at 472 (Randall, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 472-73.
151. See id. at 473.
152. See id.
153. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); see supra notes 85-88
and accompanying text.
154. Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978).
155. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); see supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
156. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974); see supra notes
90-95 and accompanying text.
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lation had no support in the caselaw. The dissent also argued that the
majority effectively eliminated the reliance requirement, a clear break
with Rule lOb-5 precedent,1 7 since positive proof of the plaintiff's nonre-
liance would not affect the plaintiff's recovery under the majority's
reasoning. 15
The dissent acknowledged two lines of cases in which courts had re-
laxed the reliance requirement: total nondisclosure cases 59 and fraud on
the market cases." 6 However, whereas the majority would add Shores as
a third type of case in which plaintiffs merited the presumption of reli-
ance, the dissent distinguished the Shores holding as different in kind
from the other two lines of cases. In both the total nondisclosure and the
fraud on the developed market contexts, positive proof of the plaintiff's
nonreliance on the defendant's misrepresentations rebutted the presump-
tion of reliance. 161 In other words, reliance was still an element for re-
covery, but the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to rebut the
presumption. 62 The dissent viewed Shores as dispensing with reliance as
an element altogether because proof of the plaintiff's nonreliance would
not affect recovery. 16
3
The dissent also pointed out that the only factual situation in which
courts have not required reliance as an element of recovery under Rule
lOb-5 has been the forced sale context."6 As discussed earlier, when
plaintiffs alleged that they had sustained a loss as the result of a fraudu-
lent scheme to bring about a forced sale of their securities, they need not
prove reliance because they had made no investment decision to partici-
pate in the transaction.165 Since the plaintiffs did not make a free choice,
157. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 474 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall, J., dissenting),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). Additionally, the Fifth Circuit required that the reli-
ance was reasonable. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
434 U.S. 911 (1977).
158. Under the majority's formulation, positive proof of nonreliance on defendant's
fraudulent acts would not affect recovery since it does not affect any of the elements in
the test: (1) defendant's scienter, (2) bonds not entitled to be marketed, (3) availability of
the market as an indication of the bonds' genuineness, and (4) plaintiffs loss. See Shores
v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
159. See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text. Circuit courts have interpreted the
presumption of reliance to be rebuttable upon positive proof of plaintiffs nonreliance on
the omitted facts. See Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1978).
160. See supra 97-127 and accompanying text.
161. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 481 (Randall, J., dissenting).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 474.
164. See id. at 479 (Randall, J., dissenting) (citing Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975)).
165. See id. at 480 ("[W]here the success of a fraud does not require an exercise of
volition by the plaintiff, but instead requires an exercise of volition by other persons, there
need be no showing that the plaintiff himself relied upon the deception.") (citing Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 822 (1970)); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.) ("Whatever
need there may be to show reliance in other situations [citing List and other cases], we
regard it as unnecessary in the limited instance when no volitional act is required and the
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they need not prove reliance to recover.' 66 The dissent argued, however,
that Shores did not fit this fact pattern because the plaintiffs made a voli-
tional investment decision. 167
Even if the majority's opinion in Shores was supported by some prece-
dent and did not conflict with established case law, the dissent presented
several policy arguments against granting the presumption of reliance to
plaintiffs in a primary market context. 'First, such a standard would in-
troduce an ambiguous distinction between fraudulently marketed bonds
that, absent fraud, can be marketed at some price and those bonds that,
absent fraud, cannot be marketed at any price.' 68 Second, the majority
opinion carried a great potential for increasing the volume of litigation by
providing a federal forum to those who by their own actions would
otherwise have forfeited protection of the rule and relegated themselves
to state court actions for conversion.16 9 Finally, the majority opinion
had the potential for protracting much Rule lOb-5 litigation that would
otherwise have terminated at the summary judgment phase. 170
B. Confusion in Applying the Shores Standard
Courts interpreting the Shores decision have disagreed over the scope
and application of the Fifth Circuit's "not entitled to be marketed" stan-
dard. The result of this disagreement has been a plethora of standards
and tests: (1) the "patently worthless" test; (2) the "issued in violation of
applicable law" test; (3) the "economic unmarketability" test; and (4) the
"factual unmarketability" test.' Each of these tests is reviewed briefly
below.
1. The Patently Worthless Test
The Fifth Circuit refined its Shores analysis in Abell v. Potomac Insur-
ance Company.'72 In Abell, the offering circular for municipal bonds
contained various omissions and misstatements concerning the character
and history of the project's developer.' 73 The plaintiff bondholder class
sued, invoking Shores' presumption of reliance in new issue bond offer-
ings. When the defendants responded that the Shores standard only ap-
plied when the bonds were worthless, the plaintiffs countered that the
Shores plaintiffs had received only thirty-seven percent of their invest-
ment upon liquidation of that project; thus, no showing of complete
result of a forced sale is exactly that intended by the wrongdoer."), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967).
166. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 480 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
167. See id. at 481.
168. See id. at 472.
169. See id. at 473.
170. See id.
171. See infra notes 177-211 and accompanying text.
172. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
173. See id. at 1111-12.
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worthlessness was necessary. 174
The Fifth Circuit sided with the defendants, explaining that even the
most worthless enterprises may possess salable assets. 75 In adopting this
position, the court refined the Shores standard, holding that plaintiffs can
rely on the fraud on the market's rebuttable presumption of reliance only
if the defendants "knew the enterprise itself was patently worthless." 1 76
The court refused to accept the plaintiff's testimony as to the worthless-
ness of the bonds, reasoning that the actual performance of the bonds
gave the truest assessment of their actual value. 17 7 Since the bonds had
traded at or near par value for eighteen months after the defendants had
disclosed the misstatements and omissions, the bonds were not worth-
less. 178 In other words, the Abell court interpreted the Shores "not enti-
tled to be marketed" standard to apply to securities that were, in fact,
patently worthless.
2. The Issued in Violation of Applicable Law Test
In T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel
Authority,17 9 the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Shores standard in a dif-
ferent fashion. The class plaintiff, TJ. Raney & Sons, Inc., a broker-
dealer of securities involved in the distribution of Series C bonds of de-
fendant Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Authority, alleged that the
defendants commingled the bond proceeds with other funds controlled
by the project sponsors and never used the funds for their intended pur-
pose. 80 Additionally, the plaintiff class argued that the Fort Cobb,
Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Authority was not a valid public trust and
could not legally issue bonds under applicable state law. 8'
Basing its decision on the persuasive reasoning in Shores, the Tenth
Circuit stated that federal and state regulation should permit an investor
to rely on the availability of bonds on the market as indicating their law-
ful issuance." 2 Combining the Shores rationale with the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Arthur Young, the court held that the plaintiffs satisfied
Shores' "not entitled to be marketed" standard when the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants "knowingly conspired to market securities in viola-
tion of applicable state law." '183 Since the lower court specifically had
174. See id. at 1121-22. In Abell, a local newspaper chronicled the developer's deceits
in a series of articles that compelled the underwriter to contact the bondholders to correct
the misstatements and omissions in the offering circular. Surprisingly, from the time of
disclosure until the collapse of the project eighteen months later, the bonds continued to
trade at or near par value. See id. at 1112.
175. See id at 1122.
176. Id
177. See id
178. See id
179. 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984).
180. See id. at 1331.
181. See id. at 1331, 1333.
182. See id. at 1333.
183. Id
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found that the bonds were issued in violation of applicable state law, the
Tenth Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs stated a valid claim, and it affirmed
the district court's denial of the defendants' motion to decertify the class.
3. The Economic Unmarketability Test
In Ross v. Bank South, N.A, I 4 the class of plaintiff bondholders simi-
larly invoked the fraud on the market's presumption of reliance because
they had not read the disclosure materials. 185 The plaintiffs claimed that
the defendants knew the bonds were unmarketable because the defend-
ants had raised the price of the units far above what they had been
warned was the highest price that the market could bear." 6 Addition-
ally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in sham transac-
tions to meet the pre-sale quota and to make the project appear
successful. 187 The trial court granted the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment because the plaintiffs had not read the disclosure
materials.1 88
Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment for the
defendants, holding that the plaintiffs had not established a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the marketability of the bonds.189 The court
cited Shores for the proposition that securities were unmarketable only
when they could not be offered for sale at any price. 190 Additionally, the
defendants must have known or recklessly disregarded the fact that the
securities were worthless and placed them on the market to defraud the
184. 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990). In 1981, the
former Fifth Circuit divided to create the present Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. The Elev-
enth Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior
to September 30, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981). As a result, the court in Ross was bound by the Fifth Circuit decision of
Shores. See Ross, 885 F.2d at 732 n. 1.
185. See Ross, 885 F.2d at 727. In Ross, Arthur Rice, a developer, entered into an
agreement with the city of Vestavia Hill, Alabama, to create a municipal authority for
issuing revenue bonds to finance a residential and medical facility for the elderly. The
bonds were to be repaid solely through sales of the residential units. After two under-
writers declined to support the project in light of sluggish market for the bonds and for
similar apartment units, the board of trustees abandoned the project, citing insufficient
progress in obtaining pre-sale commitments and in securing conventional financing. Rice
convinced another underwriter and brokerage firm, as well as a new bond counsel and
feasibility consultant, to form a joint venture to proceed with the project using signifi-
cantly higher unit prices and interest rates. Under the new arrangement, Rice was re-
quired to presell 50% of the units. Faced with light demand, he dropped the deposit
requirement, residency requirement, and accepted several applications from family mem-
bers, friends, and employees. In addition, the official statement did not disclose the pro-ject's troubled financial history and preselling problems. The bonds defaulted three years
later because the sales of residential units proved insufficient to support the project. See
id. at 725-29.
186. See id. at 730.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 731.
189. See id. at 730.
190. See id. at 729.
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public.191 The court found, however, that the Ross defendants did not
reach this threshold level. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished the situa-
tion in Ross with the facts in Shores. The Ross plaintiffs alleged misstate-
ments in the official statement; there were no allegations of pervasive and
elaborate schemes outside of official documents as in Shores.192 Addi-
tionally, in Shores, the defendants concealed existing factors vital to the
economic viability of the project.193 In Ross, the fraud centered on pro-
jections of an uncertain future occurrence: the sale of units.'94
4. The Factual Unmarketability Test
In Ross v. Bank South, N.A., Judge Tjoflat concurred in the judgment,
but he called for the court to overrule Shores explicitly.' 95 Tjoflat viewed
the court's holding as an impractical "economic unmarketability"' 96 test
that required the plaintiffs to show that the securities could not have been
sold at any price or interest rate.197 Tjoflat argued that since it was theo-
retically possible to market any security at some price and interest rate, a
bond can never be completely worthless.' 98 He added that the majority
had created a test that was unworkable in both theory and practice, and
that the court had negated Shores' remedial effects because defendants
would almost always be able to make some economic marketability
showing. 1
9 9
Judge Tjoflat also argued that the economic unmarketability test was
not consistent with Shores.2°° He considered Shores to have established a
"factual unnarketability" 20 test that concentrated on the security at its
actual price and interest rate. 20 2 According to Judge Tjoflat, if all of the
parties and regulatory agencies, acting in good faith and without fraud,
allowed the bonds to go to market, the bonds were marketable. 0 3 Be-
191. See id. at 729-30.
192. See id. at 731.
193. See id.
194. See iL
195. See id. at 733 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 736.
197. See ia- at 735-36.
198. See icL at 736 (citing Fischel, supra note 26, at 12 ("Virtually all securities will sell
for some positive price.")).
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Id
202. See id
203. See id ("[A] bond is unmarketable if, but for the fraudulent scheme, some 'regu-
latory' entity (whether official or unofficial) would not have allowed the bond to come
onto the market at its actual price and interest rate.") (emphasis in original); cf Arthur
Young & Co. v. United States District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he
purchaser of an original issue security relies, at least indirectly, on the integrity of the
regulatory process and the truth of any representations made to the appropriate agencies
and the investors at the time of the original issue."), cert denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). In
Ross, two underwriters declined to proceed with the project. When Rice found an under-
writer to proceed with the project, it was subject to conditions that Rice fraudulently
disregarded. The entities-the underwriter and the city-would have prevented the issu-
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cause extraordinarily risky securities or severely overvalued securities
were entitled to be marketed, Tjoflat saw his formulation as the only
reasonable interpretation of Shores.2°4
Judge Tjoflat, who had dissented in Shores, further argued that the
Ross majority should have directly overruled Shores because investors
could not reasonably rely on an inefficient market to preclude unmarket-
able securities.2 °5 The efficient capital market hypothesis allows courts
to presume that investors can reasonably rely on the market to set accu-
rate prices in a well-developed market. 216 Judge Tjoflat argued that in an
undeveloped, primary market, it was not reasonable to rely on the mar-
ket's pricing mechanisms, since all the players in the issuing process had
significant self-interest in marketing a security at an inflated price.207
Judge Tjoflat stated that, as a result, an investor who relied on a primary
market to exclude unmarketable securities took a great and obvious risk
that should not be remedied by the federal securities laws. 20 8
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF THE
THEORY TO NEWLY ISSUED SECURITIES
Section I examined the origin, theoretical basis, and development of
the fraud on the market theory. Section II explored the extension of
fraud on the market through the fraud created the market theory to the
context of newly issued securities. This Section analyzes the validity of
both versions20 9 of the presumption of reliance-fraud on the market
theory as adopted by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson and the
fraud created the market theory enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in Shores
v. Sklar-by examining whether either version of the theory is consistent
with the underlying policies, goals and requirements of Rule lOb-5 in the
new issues context.
A. Basic's Version of Fraud on the Market Extended to
Primary Markets
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court adopted the rebuttable
presumption of reliance supported by fraud on the market theory in
open, actively traded and well-developed markets.210 Under Basic's ver-
sion of the fraud on the market theory, the existence of an efficient mar-
ket was an essential element for recovery. 211 In contrast, Shores
ance had Rice not concealed the relevant information from them. See Ross, 885 F.2d at
733-34, 736-37 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
204. See Ross, 885 F.2d at 736.
205. See id. at 738-40.
206. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
207. See Ross, 885 F.2d at 739-40.
208. See id.
209. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
210. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244-47 (1988).
211. See id. at 245-47; Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 197 (6th Cir.
1990); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
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extended the fraud on the market theory to primary markets.2" Courts
have consistently held that primary markets are not efficient.2" 3 Thus,
there exists considerable consensus among courts that Basic's version of
fraud on the market theory should not extend to the new issues
context.
214
Proponents of extending Basic's version of fraud on the market to the
new issues context could argue, however, that primary markets can act
efficiently. This argument posits that the entities issuing new securities
can act as a surrogate for market forces by incorporating all material,
publicly available information into the offering price of the new security.
This argument assumes that the entities involved in the issuing process-
developers, underwriters, bond counsels, accounting firms, municipal au-
thorities, etc.-all have strong incentive to position a security at an accu-
rate price and yield that reflects all material information, so that
potential investors will have sufficient confidence in that price to
purchase the security. 215 Thus, the securities are issued at efficient prices
and yields.
The argument will probably fail because, as discussed above, many
courts have not endorsed the idea that primary markets can function as
efficient markets.21 6 Additionally, critics are skeptical as to whether the
self-interested players involved in the issuing process have an incentive to
price securities accurately.217 They argue that, instead, these entities
have an incentive to act inefficiently and overprice securities.218
B. Validity of Shores' Fraud Created the Market Theory
Courts and commentators who oppose the fraud created the market
theory developed in Shores emphasize the novelty of the Shores decision
in their attempt to distance fraud created the market from the theories of
relaxed reliance that the Supreme Court adopted in Basic, Mills, and
Ute.219 Proponents of the Shores approach, on the other hand, empha-
size that, although the fraud created the market theory employs a differ-
ent underlying mechanism to account for the effect of defendant's
fraudulent acts, the theory fits under the more general rubric of the fraud
492 U.S. 914 (1989); Greenberg v. Boettcher & Co., 755 F. Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Ill.
1991); In re Newbridge Networks Sec. Litig., 767 F. Supp. 275, 283 (D.D.C. 1991).
212. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468-70 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1102 (1983).
213. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
215. Cf supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (describing factors necessary for
market efficiency).
216. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
217. See Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 740 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990); Lockwood, supra note 27, at 1317-18.
218. See Ross, 885 F.2d at 740 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
219. See eg, Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 472 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that the fraud created the market theory is a new theory of recovery under
l0b-5), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
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on the market theory: a theory in which plaintiff-investors may establish
indirect reliance on defendant's misrepresentations as a means of fulfil-
ling Rule lOb-5's reliance requirement.220 The subsections that follow
examine arguments assessing the validity of the fraud created the market
theory.
1. Shores' Marketability Standard
Circuit courts cannot agree on how to interpret Shores' ambiguous
"not entitled to be marketed" standard.22 1 In addition, some judges ar-
gue that the formulation creates needless complications and distinctions
and is inherently flawed.222 These opponents of the fraud created the
market theory contend that it is unfair and unwise to base a theory of
Rule 10b-5 recovery on a mysterious and unclear standard, especially
considering the huge potential liability involved and resources committed
by defendants in securities class actions.223 That is, compared to the
clear standard in Basic, the unclear marketability standard in Shores
should not provide a remedy for plaintiffs.224
Proponents of the fraud created the market theory could counter that
legal rules are often unclear and applied differently by circuit courts until
the Supreme Court addresses and resolves the issue. Critics of the fraud
created the market theory convincingly respond to these proponents by
arguing that, even if the Supreme Court defined a more precise marketa-
bility standard, any judicial attempt at measuring a given security's mar-
ketability but for an alleged fraudulent scheme is a highly speculative and
precarious undertaking.225 Additionally, fraud created the market the-
ory, with its emphasis on courts somehow determining marketability but
for fraud, is a poor substitute for the empirically based, precise pricing
mechanism of the efficient capital market hypothesis in Basic.226 Fur-
ther, courts have noted that the Shores test could have the inequitable
and incongruous result that the victim of a truly fraudulent scheme, ex-
actly the kind of plaintiff that the relaxed reliance requirement is sup-
posed to remedy, would not receive the presumption of reliance because
220. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 468-72; see also Cohen, supra note 8, at 758-61 (including
fraud created the market as a context in which the presumption of reliance supported by
the fraud on the market theory is valid).
221. See supra notes 172-208 and accompanying text.
222. See Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 738- 40 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990); Shores, 647 F.2d at 472-73, 486-87 (Ran-
dall, J., dissenting).
223. See Ross, 885 F.2d at 733 (Tjoflat, J., concurring); Shores, 647 F.2d at 472-73,
486-87 (Randall, J., dissenting).
224. Compare Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-48 (1988) (stating clearly the
requirements necessary for the presumption of reliance) with Shores, 647 F.2d at 465
(setting out the confusing not entitled to be marketed standard).
225. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 473 (Randall, J. dissenting); Ockerman v. May Zima &
Co., 785 F. Supp. 695, 700 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
226. See supra notes 27-57 and accompanying text.
S178 [Vol. 61
FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY
the securities were marketable in the absolute sense, i.e., they were not
worthless.22 7
2. Pure Causation
Courts and commentators criticize the fraud created the market theory
for eliminating the Rule lOb-5 reliance requirement and embodying a
doctrine of pure causation that exposes defendants to unlimited liabil-
ity.22' In Basic, the Supreme Court rejected a pure causation approach
when it explicitly retained the reliance requirement as an element of a
Rule lOb-5 action by allowing the defendant the opportunity to rebut the
presumption of reliance." 9 The ease with which a court allows defend-
ants to rebut the presumption indicates how closely the court adheres to
a traditional showing of direct reliance-the easier the rebuttal, the
closer the court is to the traditional showing of direct reliance. 2 0
In a fraud on the market claim based on trading in an efficient market,
defendants may rebut the presumption of reliance by attacking either the
objective or subjective components of causation (materiality and reliance,
respectively)." 1 In his dissent in Basic, Justice White warned against a
policy of pure causation that would exist where the plaintiff established
liability solely upon a showing of materiality, the objective component of
causation." 2 In his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun directly ad-
dressed White's concern by emphasizing that if the defendant could rebut
the subjective component of causation, reliance, the defendant would es-
cape liability.'2 3 In the case of fraud created the market, plaintiffs can
rebut the objective component by establishing that the security was in
fact marketable.2 4 Because fraud created the market theory focuses on a
generalized scheme to defraud, however, a defendant who successfully
rebuts the subjective component of causation (plaintiffis reliance on the
defendant's misrepresentation in a disclosure document)-a showing that
would rebut the presumption and negate liability under a Basic ap-
proach-would not defeat a cause of action brought under the fraud cre-
ated the market theory.3 In other words, because a defendant cannot
227. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 473 (Randall, J., dissenting).
228. See id. at 484-87 (Randall, J., dissenting); Black, supra note 8, at 932.
229. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988).
230. See Black, supra note 8, at 934.
231. To rebut the objective component, the defendant must show that the misstate-
ments or omissions at issue were not material, or that an insufficient number of traders
relied on the misrepresentations to affect the market price. A defendant may attack the
subjective component of reliance by showing that the plaintiff either knew the truth or
would have nonetheless traded had he known all the relevant facts. See Basic, 485 U.S. at
248-49.
232. See id. at 255 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
233. See id. at 248-49.
234. See; eg., Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468-72 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that de-
fendant can rebut the presumption of reliance upon a showing that the securities at issue
were marketable), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
235. Compare Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49 (describing ways a defendant can rebut the
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rebut the subjective component, causation and reliance are based solely
on a showing of marketability, i.e., pure causation. Opponents of fraud
created the market theory can point to this distinction to explain why the
Shores theory is a doctrine of pure causation while grudgingly accepting
the validity of the theory in Basic.
The proponent of the fraud created the market theory could respond
by arguing in favor of a pure causation approach to Rule 1Ob-5 litiga-
tion.236 Courts have consistently rejected such an argument, however.237
Alternatively, proponents of the fraud created the market theory could
attempt to argue that once the plaintiff has established that the securities
were not marketable, a defendant would still be able to rebut the pre-
sumption by proving that the plaintiff knew about the fraudulent scheme
when the plaintiff bought the securities, or that the plaintiff would have
bought the securities even if the plaintiff had known about the fraudulent
scheme.238
Critics of fraud created the market theory respond that this is not a
reasonable means for the defendant to rebut the presumption because no
reasonable plaintiff knowingly would buy worthless bonds that a defend-
ant fraudulently marketed.239 In contrast, it was reasonable to assume
that, in the Basic context, the plaintiff may have bought the stock know-
ing that the defendants made misrepresentations in a disclosure docu-
ment.2' The plaintiff may believe, for example, that despite the
misrepresentation the security was worth buying because the company in
question was an inviting takeover target, or that the stock might experi-
ence an industry wide upward movement due to extrinsic factors.24'
This rationale does not transfer to a new issue of securities that a plaintiff
knew was worthless and the product of a general, ongoing scheme to de-
fraud investors.
3. Does Market Integrity Imply Market Efficiency?
Under the fraud created the market theory, plaintiffs rely on the integ-
rity of the market or the integrity of the regulatory process to prevent the
presumption of reliance) with Shores, 647 F.2d at 468-72 (limiting defendant's ability to
rebut the presumption to proving the bonds were marketable). See also Lockwood, supra
note 27, at 1315-18 (explaining the Shores presumption as purely objective so that proof
of subjective nonreliance was virtually impossible).
236. See Black, supra note 8, at 926.
237. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-47. For the development of the reliance requirement,
see supra notes 68-127 and accompanying text.
238. Cf. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-47 (holding that defendant may rebut presumption of
reliance if plaintiff knew about the misrepresentation, or plaintiff would have acted re-
gardless of the knowledge of the misrepresentation).
239. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 483-85 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
240. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49.
241. In Basic, Justice Blackmun provided other situations in which the defendant may
rebut the presumption, e.g., the plaintiff may have wanted to buy (or sell) the stock for
political reasons. See id.
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marketing of fraudulent bonds.24 2 Opponents of the fraud created the
market theory maintain that when reliance on market integrity is di-
vorced from the concept of market efficiency, reliance on the integrity of
the market becomes hopelessly general and meaningless.243 Market in-
tegrity, absent an underlying theory to explain the causal mechanism and
limit potential plaintiffs, exposes defendants to limitless liability. 2"
These critics envision a "slippery slope," contending that if the general
expectation that markets are free from fraud is to serve as a basis for
dispensing with subjective reliance in the Shores type primary market
context, there is probably no principled reason for requiring subjective
reliance in any fraud context.245
Proponents of the fraud created the market theory counter that integ-
rity of the market does not have to imply market efficiency. Instead,
integrity could simply refer to an expectation that a market is free from
fraud.2' To these observers, an investor's expectation that securities
markets are free from fraud is understandable and reasonable.247 In ad-
dition, since this expectation encourages investment, it is something
worth protecting. Further, the slippery slope argument fails to recognize
that courts routinely draw lines, often arbitrarily, in many legal contexts.
Moreover, the fraud created the market theory contains an explicit check
on liability: defendants may rebut the presumption.248
The proponent of fraud created the market's argument fails, however,
because reliance on a general expectation that market's are free from
fraud in a primary market context leads to unlimited liability without
some underlying theory to impose limits on the concept of market integ-
rity. Further, it bypasses the checks on unlimited liability established in
Basic.249 In addition, some critics argue that a plaintiff's reliance on in-
tegrity of the market or the regulatory process is not reasonable since the
entities involved in the issuing process stand to gain financially from the
242. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102
(1983).
243. See id. at 483-87 (Randall, J., dissenting); cf Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47 ("Wilt is
hard to imagine that there is ever a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integ-
rity.") (citations omitted).
244. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 473-75; id at 483-87 (Randall, J., dissenting); Ross v.
Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 738-40 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990); Lockwood, supra note 27, 1315-18.
245. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 483-87; Lockwood, supra note 27, 1315-18.
246. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47 ("[lit is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or
seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a
crooked crap game?") (citations omitted); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir.
1975) ("The statute and rule are designed to foster an expectation that securities markets
are free from fraud-an expectation on which purchasers should be able to rely."), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
247. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247; Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907.
248. See eg., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that presumption was rebuttable upon a showing of marketability), cerL denied, 492
U.S. 914 (1989).
249. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
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sale of securities at inflated prices.2 50
4. Congressional Intent
In Basic, Justice White argued by analogy with section 18 of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act that Congress' intent when enacting section 10 of the
1934 Act was to require plaintiffs to prove direct reliance to proceed with
a private cause of action.251 Rule lOb-5, as originally promulgated by the
SEC, had no private cause of action; it was judicially conferred. 25 2 The
scant legislative history of section 10(b) has led the Court to look at Con-
gress' intent in adopting other portions of the Securities Exchange Act to
discern the limits of private causes of action under Rule 10b-5. 2 " For
example, Congress flatly rejected a proposition analogous to the fraud on
the market theory in adopting a civil liability provision of the 1934
Act.2 54 Section 18, one of the few provisions of the Act that provided for
a private cause of action and that was adopted at the same time as section
10(b), expressly required that the plaintiff prove that a misrepresentation
in a report filed with the SEC both affected the price of the security and
was relied upon by plaintitf.255 Significantly, the original version of sec-
tion 18 did not contain a direct reliance requirement, and Congress
amended the original version to include a reliance requirement due to
criticism over its omission.256 When confronted with the issue then,
Congress appeared to favor the direct reliance requirement. This argu-
ment applies with equal force to the fraud created the market theory,
since it similarly contradicts Congress' intention to condition plaintiff's
recovery on direct reliance on defendant's misstatements.
Proponents of fraud created the market theory counter that section
18's legislative history is not dispositive for section 10(b) purposes. The
legislative intent behind section 10(b) is ambiguous.25 7 Changed circum-
stances in the securities markets and considerations of policy, particu-
larly the policy in favor of facilitating class actions, have led courts to
liberalize their initial restrictive interpretations of reliance under section
10(b). 25 8 Further, the reliance requirement in the Rule lOb-5 context is a
judge-made standard. It is properly within the discretion of the courts to
relax the requirement that they had established previously. In addition,
Congress did not move to amend Rule lOb-5 to require direct reliance
250. See Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 738-40 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990).
251. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
252. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
253. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204-06 (1976).
254. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 257 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
255. See id. at 257; Bloomenthal, supra note 70, § 2.04, at 2-10.
256. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 258 (quoting 78 Cong. Rec. 7701 (1934) (Chairman Ray-
burn) ("[The] bill as originally written was very much challenged on the ground that
reliance should be required.")).
257. See id. at 257 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
258. See id. at 243-44.
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after Basic. Instead, Congress appears content to leave the resolution of
this issue to the courts.
5. Disclosure Policy of the Securities Laws
Critics of the fraud created the market theory point out that, tradition-
ally, the Supreme Court has held that Rule lOb-5 and the securities laws
in general have a "'fundamental purpose ... to substitute a philosophy
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.' "259 The
Court has held that the method that Congress has chosen to promote the
ultimate goal of a high standard of business ethics in the securities mar-
kets is to require full disclosure of material information to investors. 26°
While it is clear that the ultimate goal of section 10 of the Securities
Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 is to prevent fraud in the purchase and
sale of securities, courts and commentators are divided on whether the
means to achieving this goal should follow the narrower, traditional em-
phasis on full disclosure of material information or the more expansive
focus on preventing fraud generally.261 Opponents of fraud created the
market theory contend that the theory improperly presumes the expan-
sive interpretation. Additionally, critics of the fraud created the market
theory emphasize that the availability of the theory further emasculates
the policy of full disclosure by encouraging plaintiffs to disregard disclo-
sure documents because plaintiffs can state a claim for relief without hav-
ing actually read and acted on the affirmative misstatements contained
therein.262
Proponents of fraud created the market theory attempt to counter by
arguing that the expansive interpretation flows from the express language
of Rule lOb-5, which reads like a general anti-fraud provision.26 3 In ad-
dition, they try to argue that the theory is consistent with the traditional
full disclosure rationale. One commentator argues that since the Shores
and Ross analysis extends only to securities that are worthless, not
merely overvalued, purchasers of securities still have strong incentive to
259. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
260. See id; see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) ("[T]he
Court repeatedly has described the 'fundamental purpose' of the [1934] Act as imple-
menting a 'philosophy of full disclosure'; once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the
fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute.").
261. Compare Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477-78 (full disclosure) with Shores v. Sklar. 647
F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he purposes of the securities acts and Rule lOb-5 are
far broader than merely providing full disclosure or fostering informed investment deci-
sions."), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
262. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 258-59 (1988) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Shores, 647 F.2d at 483 (Randall, J., dissenting); see also
Black, supra note 5, at 457-59 (stating that the presumption of reliance encourages plain-
tiffs to disregard disclosure documents).
263. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 468-72; Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 785 F. Supp. 695,
702 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933).
1993] S183
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
read disclosure materials to make sure they do not receive an overvalued
but not worthless security.216 Critics of the fraud created the market
theory could respond that distinguishing an overvalued from a worthless
security through examining disclosure documents is not reasonable given
the complexity of the document and unsophisticated nature of the inves-
tor.2 6' Additionally, some versions of the fraud created the market the-
ory allow recovery on securities that are underpriced, not worthless.266
More importantly, when courts condition recovery on a plaintiff's read-
ing and relying on disclosure documents, it enforces the congressionally
mandated policy of full disclosure of information by strongly encourag-
ing investors to read disclosure documents.
CONCLUSION
Courts should not apply a presumption of reliance in primary markets
based on either the Basic or the Shores version of the fraud on the market
theory. The fraud on the market theory adopted by the Supreme Court
in Basic cannot extend to primary markets because it is valid only in
efficient markets. Courts and commentators are in agreement that pri-
mary markets do not act efficiently.
Courts should also not recognize the fraud created the market theory
as a valid theory of recovery because the undefinable and ambiguous na-
ture of the Shores standard detracts from the theory's validity. More
importantly, the fraud created the market theory does not have the theo-
retical and empirical basis that the efficient capital market hypothesis
provides to the fraud on the market theory in Basic. That is, there is no
coherent mechanism to provide the causal nexus between defendant's
fraud and plaintiff's investment decision. The reliance requirement,
therefore, becomes purely objective. This virtual elimination of subjec-
tive reliance-a policy of pure causation-is at odds with the Supreme
Court's explicit recognition that reliance is an essential element of a Rule
10b-5 claim. As long as Rule 10b-5 continues to require reliance as an
essential element of the cause of action, fraud created the market cannot
serve as a coherent theory of recovery. Finally, there are strong policy
arguments against the fraud created the market theory that, when added
to the lack of theoretical and empirical basis for the theory, militate
strongly against its acceptance as a valid theory of recovery in primary
markets.
264. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 470; Schmidt, supra note 8, at 520-21.
265. See Kripke, supra note 3, at 631-32.
266. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
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